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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Applied The Exclusionary Rule Where The Cell Phone
In Question Was Searched Pursuant To A Valid Search Warrant
A.

Introduction
The district court erred by suppressing evidence found on Wolfe’s cell phone

because, even assuming the initial seizure of the phone was improper, “the evidence
obtained from the cell phone was the product of a search conducted under a valid search
warrant, untainted by any illegality in the seizure of the phone.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
Wolfe first argues the state is making this argument for the “first time on appeal,” and that
it is not preserved. (Respondent’s brief, p. 9.) Specifically, she argues that the prosecution
did not present the independent source doctrine and “arguably waived this exception at the
hearing on its motion for reconsideration.” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 10-17.) Review of the
record shows this argument to be meritless. The record shows that the issue was presented
to the district court. More importantly, because seizure of the phone was not a but-for
cause of the discovery of the evidence, it was Wolfe who failed to carry her burden before
the trial court. Wolfe next argues the district court did not err on the merits because the
state failed to demonstrate that the warrant was obtained independently of the seizure of
the cell phone. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-24.) However, it was Wolfe who bore the
burden of showing that the seizure of the phone was a but-for cause of the discovery of the
evidence, and because the seizure played no role in securing the search warrant Wolfe
failed in that burden.

1

B.

Whether Suppression Was The Proper Remedy For The Presumably Invalid
Seizure Of The Cell Phone Was Preserved For Appellate Review
Wolfe moved to suppress the evidence found on her cell phone, contending officers

seized it without a warrant, without consent, not incident to arrest, and without exigent
circumstances. (R., p. 65.) The prosecution responded, arguing that the seizure did not
violate Wolfe’s search and seizure rights. (R., pp. 74-78.) The district court, however,
determined that the warrantless seizure of the cell phone was not constitutionally justified.
(R., pp. 117-20.) The state moved for reconsideration. (R., pp. 136-43.) In reconsideration
the state argued that suppression of evidence found pursuant to execution of the search
warrant for the phone was appropriate only if the warrant lacked probable cause once any
illegally obtained evidence was excluded. (R., pp. 140-141 (citing State v. Russo, 157
Idaho 299, 306, 336 P.3d 232, 239 (2014).)
On appeal, the state contends that, even assuming the unconstitutionality of the
initial seizure of the cell phone, suppression was erroneously granted because the proper
remedy for an illegal seizure of the phone was to exclude any evidence obtained from the
seizure from the warrant application and determine if the warrant was still based on
probable cause. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing Russo, 157 Idaho at 306, 336 P.3d at 239).)
Where a party objects and the court’s order is contrary to the objection, the merits of the
objection are reviewable on appeal. State v. Miller, 157 Idaho 838, 841-42, 340 P.3d 1154,
1157-58 (Ct. App. 2014). Because the state objected before the district court to suppression
where the search warrant was untainted by the seizure, using the same argument and even
the same authority as the state relies upon on appeal, this issue is preserved for appellate
review.
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On appeal Wolfe candidly acknowledges the state’s reliance on Russo before the
district court, and acknowledges that Russo is “an independent source doctrine case.”
(Respondent’s brief, p. 5.) In her argument that the independent source doctrine was not
an issue raised to the district court Wolfe relies on an exchange at the hearing on
reconsideration on whether the court was to apply the independent source or the attenuation
doctrines. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-14 (citing Tr., p. 111, L. 25 – p. 112, L. 10).) In
that exchange the prosecutor did state that he was trying to “fit [Russo] within the realm of
attenuation” or the “umbrella of attenuation” but that there was “overlap in the way the
case could be interpreted as an independent source.” (Tr., p. 112, Ls. 6-10.) This argument
did not waive consideration of Russo, nor did it waive the argument, made in the
reconsideration brief, that the proper remedy for an improper seizure of the cell phone “‘is
not to void the warrant. Rather, it is to disregard that information and determine whether
there still remains sufficient information to provide probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant.’” (R., p. 140 (quoting Russo, 157 Idaho at 307, 336 P.3d at 240).) The
prosecutor’s ill-advised attempt to shoehorn Russo into the attenuation doctrine did not
waive his request that Russo be applied in this case.
Even if the state had not adequately raised the issue below it would be reviewable
because the district court necessarily reached and determined the issue of what remedy
Wolfe was entitled to. Russo clearly sets forth that the remedy for the illegality alleged by
Wolfe and found by the court is to exclude any illegally obtained evidence from the search
warrant application. Russo, 157 Idaho at 306, 336 P.3d at 239. By granting the remedy of
suppression the district court necessarily ruled on the question of what remedy was
appropriate for the violation, and ruled erroneously that the remedy was to void the warrant
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and suppress the evidence obtained thereby rather than merely excise wrongly obtained
evidence from the warrant.
That the proper remedy for any illegal cell phone seizure was to excise any wrongly
gained evidence from the warrant application is both required by Russo and consistent with
general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In a different context the Idaho Court of Appels
has held that, although “the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the
challenged evidence is untainted,” before the government must meet that burden the
“defendant bears an initial burden of going forward with evidence to show a factual nexus
between the illegality and the state’s acquisition of the evidence.” State v. Kapelle, 158
Idaho 121, 127, 344 P.3d 901, 907 (Ct. App. 2014). “This requires a prima facie showing
that the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the
government’s unconstitutional conduct.” State v. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 546, 400 P.3d 629,
634 (Ct. App. 2017). Where evidence is obtained pursuant to a warrant untainted by
illegally seized evidence “the threshold ‘but for’ requirement” of the exclusionary rule is
not met. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984). Because the independent
source doctrine goes to but-for causation, it was Wolfe’s burden to establish that but for
the illegal seizure of the phone the state would not have secured the search warrant.
Wolfe argues that it was the state that bore the burden of showing that she was not
entitled to suppression due to an independent source. (Respondent’s brief, p. 17.) She is
only half right. Her argument fails to recognize that there are two prongs that must be met
before it is proper to suppress evidence because of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Although the state bears the burden of showing the lack of taint, before the government
must meet that burden the defendant must prove that the state would not have acquired the
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evidence but for the illegality. Dahl, 162 Idaho at 546, 400 P.3d at 634; Kapelle, 158 Idaho
at 127, 344 P.3d at 907. That initial burden was not met in this case.
To support her argument that the state had the burden of proof, Wolfe cites Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 & n. 5 (1984). (Respondent’s brief, p. 17.) In Nix, police
illegally obtained statements from the defendant, Williams, regarding where the body of
his ten-year-old murder victim was and where he had abandoned articles of her clothing.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 435-37. Williams was granted a new trial, where his statements were
suppressed as obtained in violation of his right to counsel, but evidence gathered as a result
of the statements, including evidence related to the victim’s body, was not. Id. at 436-37.
In addressing whether the derivative evidence should have been suppressed, the Court
noted the independent source doctrine, which “allows admission of evidence that has been
discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Id. at 443. That
doctrine “[did] not apply here,” however, because the illegally obtained statements “indeed
led police to the child’s body.” Id. The Court then adopted, and applied, the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Id. at 444-46. 1
Nix has no application in this case. It addressed inevitable discovery and not
independent source because the evidence was discovered as a result of the primary

1

In addressing the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Court stated that,
“[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means—here the
volunteers’ search—then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should
be received.” Id. at 444. In a footnote the Court stated that the preponderance of the
evidence standard applied at suppression hearings, and rejected an argument that clear and
convincing proof should be required, stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine “does
not require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression hearings.” Id. at 444,
n.5.
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illegality. In other words, it was the very fact that the but-for standard was met that made
the independent source doctrine inapplicable. That the state has the burden of showing
inevitable discovery because the evidence was in fact obtained because of the illegality is
unremarkable. It does not demonstrate that the state has the burden of showing that
evidence was not in fact obtained as a result of the illegality. That burden is on the
defendant.
This case is indistinguishable, in any meaningful way, from Segura. In that case
officers seized the object of the later search, an apartment. Segura, 468 U.S. at 800-01.
They later executed a search warrant, whereby they obtained the evidence the defendant
sought to suppress. Id. at 801-02. In addressing independent source, the Court stated that
“[n]one of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related
in any way to the initial entry.” Id. at 814. The Court first held that the evidence was not
suppressible under the theory the taint was dissipated by execution of the untainted search
warrant. Id. at 814-15. However, the Court also found exclusion improper under the butfor standard, holding it was “clear” that the “illegal entry into petitioner’s apartment did
not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant.” Id. at
815. The Court expressly rejected the theory that taking control of the evidence was the
but-for causation of its discovery pursuant to the warrant. Id. at 815-16.
The exclusionary rule has two components: the but-for component and the
attenuation component. The independent source doctrine addresses the first of these
components: whether the evidence was discovered as a result of the illegality or rather
through an independent source. Wolfe’s remedy for the illegal seizure of the phone was to
have any evidence gained as a result of that seizure excised from the warrant application.
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Wolfe bore the burden of showing that the illegality she claimed resulted in the discovery
of the evidence; the state did not have to argue or independently establish the lack of butfor discovery of the evidence. Because it was her burden below, she cannot claim the state
failed to preserve its claim that the district court granted the wrong remedy.

C.

Wolfe Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Would Not Have Been Obtained
But For The Seizure
As Russo makes clear, the remedy Wolfe was entitled to for her claimed Fourth

Amendment violation was to excise evidence found pursuant to the seizure of the phone
from the warrant application, not to simply void the warrant. 157 Idaho at 306-07, 336
P.3d at 239-40 (where a cell phone was improperly seized and subsequently searched
pursuant to a warrant “the proper remedy is not to void the warrant” but is to “disregard
that information and determine whether there still remains sufficient information to provide
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant”). There is no reasonable dispute on the
record that the district court granted an erroneous remedy. (R., pp. 117-19, 168-70.)
Moreover, application of the correct remedy shows Wolfe was not entitled to suppression.
First, the district court expressly found that Wolfe was not challenging the validity
of the search warrant. (R., p. 118 (“There does not appear to be any challenge to the validity
of the warrant to search the phone; rather the challenge is to the legality of the seizure and
the delay until the warrant was obtained.”).) The natural consequence of this finding by
the district court is that Wolfe was not entitled to suppression because she failed to even
claim that the state would not have obtained the evidence but for the claimed illegality.
Second, even if this court should address the conceded issue of the validity of the
search warrant, the record shows its validity. The district court found: “The parties do not
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dispute that Detective Siebel [sic] had probable cause to seize the phone.” (R., p. 118.) In
other words, Detective Seibel had probable cause to believe the phone contained evidence
of a crime before the seizure. That is the same probable cause used to obtain the warrant.
(See State’s Exhibit 1 (Aug., pp. 9-11).) Applying the correct remedy as stated in Russo
shows that probable cause was established independently of the seizure.
Wolfe argues that suppression was appropriate because the evidence did not
establish Detective Seibel’s subjective intent to obtain a search warrant before, as opposed
to after, the seizure of the phone. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-20.) The standard advocated
by Wolfe is wrong, and based on a misreading of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,
542 (1988).
The Court’s opinion in Murray begins by noting that in Segura the Court “held that
police officers’ illegal entry upon private premises did not require suppression of evidence
subsequently discovered at those premises when executing a search warrant obtained on
the basis of information wholly unconnected with the initial entry.” 487 U.S. at 535. The
Court in Murray was “faced with the question whether, again assuming evidence obtained
pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion of such evidence that
had been observed in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed.”
487 U.S. at 535. In the present case, as in Segura, Deputy Seibel obtained no evidence as
a result of the seizure of the cell phone. Thus Segura, and not Murray, controls in this case.
This conclusion is further supported by the analysis in Murray. Applying the
“general sense” of the “concept of ‘independent source’” “identifies all evidence acquired
in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 53738 (emphasis original). “Thus, where an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge
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of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be
admissible because derived from an ‘independent source.’ This is how we used the term in
Segura.” Id. at 538. Applying this rule, “evidence found for the first time during the
execution of the valid and untainted search warrant was admissible because it was
discovered pursuant to an ‘independent source.’” Id. The Court went on to note that in the
“specific sense” independent source means that evidence discovered by both tainted and
untainted means is still admissible. Id. at 538-39.
The “general sense” of Segura applies here. Because Detective Seibel did not open
the phone or review its contents, the evidence contained therein was not obtained by tainted
means, any more than the evidence found in the unlawfully secured apartment was tainted
in Segura. Because the evidence on the phone was acquired exclusively through the
warrant, and not both as a result of the warrant and a prior illegal search, the general sense
of independent source applies and the inquiry ends.
Further analysis of Murray does not undercut this conclusion. In that case officers
conducting a marijuana trafficking investigation forced entry into a warehouse where they
saw bales of marijuana. Murray, 487 U.S. at 535. They then left, maintained surveillance,
and obtained a search warrant. Id. The warrant application did not mention the prior entry
or rely on the observations of bales of marijuana. Id. at 535-36. The defendants argued
that allowing admission of the evidence found first by illegal means would “remove all
deterrence to, and indeed positively encourage, unlawful police searches” because “law
enforcement officers will routinely enter without a warrant to make sure that what they
expect to be on the premises is in fact there. If it is not, they will have spared themselves
the time and trouble of getting a warrant; if it is, they can get the warrant and use the

9

evidence despite the unlawful entry.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 539. The Court concluded that
the evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would not be from an independent source unless
“the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse.”
Id. at 543. The Court’s statement that the practice of illegally searching to confirm the
presence of suspected evidence and then seeking a warrant only if it is found would not be
condoned does not support Wolfe’s arguments, and does not establish a requirement that
the officers form the intent to obtain a search warrant prior to a seizure of the object to be
searched.
Here there was no concern that Deputy Seibel only sought the warrant because she
confirmed that the incriminating evidence was in fact on the phone. The fact that she did
not look at the contents of the phone disproves that. Wolfe’s argument based on Murray
is meritless.
Wolfe also argues that evidence of her statements to Detective Seibel should be
excluded from the warrant application because they are the fruit of the seizure of the phone,
and that without those statements the warrant application does not establish probable cause.
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 22-24.) This argument lacks merit for several reasons, including
but not limited to the following: First, Wolfe cites neither authority nor facts in the record
showing that her statements were suppressible. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.”); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153,
159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (court will not search record). Her argument that the district
court should have suppressed her statements is not fairly presented on appeal.
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Second, as noted above, the district court specifically found that Wolfe was not
challenging the validity of the search warrant. (R., p. 118 (“There does not appear to be
any challenge to the validity of the warrant to search the phone; rather the challenge is to
the legality of the seizure and the delay until the warrant was obtained.”).)
Finally, there is no merit to the claim that the seizure rendered Wolfe’s statements
involuntary. 2 “In determining whether a statement was involuntary, the inquiry is whether
the defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion.” State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476,
485-86, 362 P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 286 (1991)). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 177 (1986) (police
coercion is a necessary prerequisite to finding a statement involuntary). There is nothing
in the record suggesting that Wolfe’s statements to Detective Seibel were rendered
involuntary by the presumably illegal seizure of the cell phone.
The facts of this case are that police learned nothing by the seizure of the phone
because they did not search it. Therefore, the state obtained the evidence exclusively
through execution of the search warrant. Because the discovery of the evidence was by the
independent source of execution of the search warrant, the seizure of the phone was not a
but-for causation of the state’s acquisition of the evidence. The district court erred by
suppressing evidence that was obtained from a source independent of the found illegality.

2

Although Wolfe does not articulate any theory whereby her statements would have been
excluded, the state notes that she was given Miranda warnings. (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 2-6.)
11

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
granting suppression in part, and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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